FEATURE ARTICLE
The California Bankers Association Proposes
To Rewrite California Banking Law:
The Ultimate Blank Check*
by Gail K. Hillebrand**
INTRODUCTION
The California Bankers Association
is currently sponsoring Assembly Bill
2521 (Johnston, Vuich). This bill, which
is a two-year bill pending in the Assembly Finance and Insurance Committee,
proposes to rewrite the entire California
Financial Code division dealing with
banks. The bill exceeds three hundred
pages in printed form. It would repeal
hundreds of current sections of Division
One of the Financial Code and add 494
new sections of code. It proposes hundreds if not thousands of changes in the
language of current law. The Superintendent of Banking has described the
bill as one which "tilts the balance" in
favor of the banking industry. Testifying before a joint hearing of the Assembly Finance and Insurance Committee
and the Senate Banking Committee, the
Superintendent also stated that there is
no urgent need to rewrite the banking
law. He said, "The banking law does
work ... we should be very careful about
breaking it. " 1
As created in the Financial Code,2
the State Department of Banking licenses and regulates state-chartered banks,
offices of foreign ( other nation) banks
doing business in California, and trust
companies. Under the current banking
law, state-chartered and foreign banks
must secure the approval of the Superintendent of Banking to merge with another bank, 3 sell the bank or a business
unit of the bank, 4 acquire another bank,5
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open or close a branch office, 6 engage in
transactions with members of the board
of directors or officers,7 or engage in
certain other activities. Among the Superintendent's responsibilities are seeking a
conservatorship over banking institutions
which are incompetent or insolvent, and
liquidating insolvent banking institutions.8 In 1987 alone, five state-chartered banks failed. 9
Some of the largest banks operating
in California have federal charters and
therefore are regulated principally by
the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency of the U.S. Treasury, rather
than by the State Department of Banking. 10 The banks regulated by the
Department, however, constitute a significant portion of the California market.
According to the most recent completed
annual report of the State Department
of Banking, there are 279 state-chartered
banks with 1,683 branches throughout
California. 11 These banks have assets of
$91.2 billion. 12 The number of statechartered banks increased 66% in the
decade from 1978 to 1987. 13 The fourth
largest bank in California, First Interstate, is state-chartered.
Foreign banks regulated by the Department of Banking also are a significant presence in California. Eleven of
California's top 25 banks are subsidiaries of foreign banks. In addition,
offices of foreign banks which do not
have separately chartered California subsidiaries have assets of $68.3 million in
California. 14
Banking regulation addresses the
entry into and conduct of the banking
business for the purpose of protecting
the public. 15 Consumers are protected
through the Department's enforcement
of specific laws governing bank conduct,
and are protected from bank insolvency
through the significant but indirect
means of enforcing laws designed to
prevent activities that might weaken a
bank's financial condition, such as failure to diversify investments, bad management, or self-dealing transactions which
might drain the bank of necessary capital or wrongly transfer its assets. With
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these purposes in mind, the current
banking law absolutely prohibits certain
conduct, and allows other conduct only
with the permission of the Superintendent of Banking. The California Bankers
Association's proposal would both eliminate certain prohibitions and make it
easier to secure permission to engage in
other activities.
It is impossible to predict all the
effects of the bankers' extensive proposal
to rewrite the banking law. Problems
may be created by repealing existing
sections and rewriting them in new
language, including confusion about the
application of interpretations of current
sections to new and rewritten sections.
There are also numerous specific ways
in which the changes proposed in this
bill would directly harm consumers.
First, the bill would hurt consumers by
weakening the regulatory powers of the
Superintendent of Banking. Second, the
bill would reduce specific existing consumer rights, including the right to prevent a bank from seizing customer funds
in low-balance checking accounts to set
off against a debt to the bank, the right
to seek damages against a bank which
has violated a consumer protection statute, the right to withdraw funds from a
certificate of deposit if the deposit is
sold to another bank, and other rights.
Finally, the bill fails to address serious
problems which consumers have experienced with banks. These problems raise
a fundamental concern about the appropriateness of the banking industry proposing to rewrite the law which governs
its activities.

THE BILL WOULD HARM
CONSUMERS BY WEAKENING
BANK REGULATION
The changes proposed by AB 2521
would weaken bank regulation in a number of important ways. First, the bill
would direct the Superintendent to act
to "facilitate" the banking business. It
would create ambiguity in the statutory
standards for Banking Department approval of sales, mergers, and similar
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transactions. It would permit anticompetitive bank sales and mergers even when
the harm to competition is not outweighed by any expected benefit of the
sale or merger. It would establish strict
timelines for the Superintendent of Banking to act on applications by banks for
regulatory approval, and would require
that many types of applications are automatically approved if the timelines are
not met. It would also limit the power
of the Superintendent to refer suspected
violations of civil laws to city attorneys,
district attorneys, and the Attorney General for civil prosecution. Finally, the
bill would create new discretion in the
Superintendent of Banking to reduce
the degree of regulation of the banking
industry. It would allow the Superintendent to exempt banks from statutory
and regulatory requirements, to decide
that whole classes of activity need not
be regulated at all, or to waive any
regulation of the Department of Banking.

AB 2521 Directs
The Superintendent
to "Facilitate"
the Business of Banking
The bill directs the Superintendent
of Banking to exercise his or her powers
"in a manner that facilitates the conduct
of the banking and trust businesses within this state and promotes the financial
safety and soundness of these businesses .... " 16 This part of the bill reveals,
perhaps unintentionally, the underlying
philosophy of the Bankers Association's
proposal: that banking regulation should
serve the banking industry.

AB 2521 May Permit
Transactions Which Adversely
Affect Competition
Presently, a bank may not merge
with another bank, buy the assets of
another bank, or acquire control of another bank without approval of the
Superintendent of Banking_17 Current
law permits approval of such transactions only if any anticompetitive
effects of the transactions are clearly
outweighed by the probable improvement in public convenience, and the
transaction will not "result in a monopoly. " 18 AB 252 I keeps the requirement that mergers and sales not result
in a monopoly, but eliminates the Superintendent's required examination of other
effects on competition. 19
Retention of the "no-monopoly" standard is not enough to protect the competitive environment. An acquisition of
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control can have an anticompetitive
effect without resulting in a monopoly.
For example, according to statistics for
I 988 reported in American Banker Statistical Special Top Numbers 1989, the
three banks in California with the largest
market share of deposits had 72.8% of
the total amount of deposits held by the
top fourteen commercial bank deposit
takers. The top four banks had 8 I .4% of
these deposits. The total deposits held
by the single largest deposit-taking commercial bank was 34 times greater than
the deposits held by the tenth largest
deposit taker, and 62 times greater than
the deposits held by the fourteenth
largest deposit taker. These statistics
demonstrate a continuing need to fully
examine the effects on competition of
proposed bank sales and mergers.
Californians need a competitive banking system. Economists at the Federal
Reserve have reported that banking in
California "is characterized by a higher
degree of concentration than markets in
other major banking states. ''2° Banks in
California have historically paid lower
interest on deposits and charged higher
interest rates on consumer loans than
banks in other states. 21 The California
Bankers Association has responded to
expressions of concern about the deletion
of the effect on competition test by pointing out that banks and trust companies
remain subject to the antitrust laws.
However, an antitrust suit to enjoin or
undo a transaction is an inadequate substitute for careful review by the regulator
of the effect of the transaction on competition before the transaction is first
approved. 22

The Bill Would Make
Regulatory Standards Ambiguous
Current law allows the Superintendent to approve applications for permission to engage in various activities such
as sales of a bank, bank mergers, and
acquisition of control of a bank only if
each criterion set forth in the relevant
statutory section is satisfied. 23 These
conditions compel disapproval of a merger if the transaction would result in a
monopoly; the financial condition of an
entity acquiring a bank or trust company
would be detrimental to the financial
condition of the bank or trust company;
the competence, experience, and integrity
of the acquiring person shows that it
would not be in the best interest of the
depositors, creditors, shareholders, or
the public to permit that person to control the bank; the proposed acquisition
is unfair, unjust, or inequitable to the

depositors, creditors, or shareholders of
the acquired bank or the acquiring entity; or the applicant for approval fails
or refuses to furnish all the information
required by the Superintendent of Banking.24
Under AB 2521, the Superintendent
of Banking could approve a sale, merger,
or acquisition of control of a bank or
trust company even if the transaction
fails one or more of these tests.is The
bill identifies "decisional criteria" which
"must be considered", but does not require that an application for sale or
merger of a bank must be denied if any
statutory criterion is not met.26
Many commentators believe that the
ongoing crisis in the savings and loan
industry was caused in part by inadequate regulatory oversight. In light of
the serious dangers of lax regulation, it
is inappropriate to restructure the Financial Code so that the Superintendent of
Banking need only "consider" various
factors, and to allow the Superintendent
to approve a sale, merger, acquisition of
control, or other bank activity even if
the statutory standards are not satisfied.

•

AB 2521 Requires Automatic
Approval of Certain Applications
If the Superintendent Does Not Act
Within Strict Timeframes
The bill proposes a regulatory approval process using the so-called "deemed approval" mechanism. 27 This means
that for many kinds of decisions, the
Superintendent's failure to act within
strict timelines on an application by a
bank or trust company for approval of
some activity would result in automatic
approval of that activity. Certain types
of applications-such as those for approval of voluntary liquidation of a bank
or trust company, purchases of a bank,
mergers, or acquisitions of controlwould not be deemed approved, but the
bill would nonetheless set a deadlint for
decisions on each of these matters. 28
The "deemed approval" mechanism
may deprive the State Department of
Banking of the time it needs to fully
evaluate applications by banks and trust
companies. This weakness of a "deemed
approval" regulatory method is compounded by the bill's very short time
limits for actions by the Superintendent.
The basic time period is only 91 days.2 9
The period for approval may be extended beyond 91 days only in "extraordinary
circumstances. "JO These short timeframes
and automatic approval provisions may
make it very difficult for the Superintendent to fully evaluate the effect on the
public and on bank safety and soundness
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of proposed bank activities, while at the
same time fulfilling the Department's
ongoing function of supervising existing
banks. As the Department of Banking
recently stated in a letter on the bill:
The primary responsibility of
the Superintendent is to ensure
safety and soundness of banks.
Accordingly, the Department should
be able to give priority to functions that directly support safety
and soundness, such as making
examinations, taking enforcement
actions, and closing banks. However, establishing rigid timeframes
for processing applications would
make the Department 'driven' by
applications, and allocation of the
Department's resources would be
dictated by application filings,
which are beyond the power of
the Department to either predict
or control. Such a result would be
contrary to the interest of safety
and soundness.3 1

AB 2521 Restricts the
Superintendent's Ability to
Refer Violations of Law
for Civil Prosecution
AB 2521 narrowly limits the authority
of the Superintendent to refer evidence
of an apparent violation of law. The bill
would permit the Superintendent to refer
evidence to state, local or federal agencies which may indicate a violation of
law only if the conduct "is punishable as
a crime."3 2 However, many important
consumer protection statutes are enforced as a matter of civil law by the
Attorney General, district attorneys, city
attorneys, and others. The Superintendent should be free to refer evidence of
potential violations of both civil and
criminal laws to all appropriate state
and federal enforcement agencies. If this
topic is to be directly addressed in a
rewrite, the proposed new section should
require or at least presume the appropriateness of referral by the regulator of
all civil and criminal violations to law
enforcement authorities.

The Bill Proposes an Inappropriate
Level of Regulatory Discretion
At the same time that it increases
administrative discretion with respect to
regulatory approvals, AB 2521 also would
provide the Superintendent with a new,
more liberal standard to allow the Superintendent to exempt banks from regulations and orders.JJ For example, proposed section 204(c) would permit the
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Superintendent to waive any existing regulation or order whenever he or she deems
it to be either in the public interest or
"necessary or appropriate .... " Current law
limits waiver to instances where the Superintendent makes a finding that compliance
is "not necessary in the public interest. ''3 4
The ongoing crisis in the savings and
loan industry has all too clearly shown
the serious results of overly lenient regulation, particularly at a time when institutions are receiving new powers. In a
recent special report by the San Francisco Chronicle, the owner of one thrift
association was quoted as describing this
period in the savings and loan association industry's history as "a crook's paradise. "35
The purpose of statutory restrictions
and statutory standards is to ensure that
regulators do in fact apply adequate standards. Regulatory statutes are meaningless
if they set forth standards on the one
hand and then give the regulator broad
power to exempt the regulated from
those standards on the other hand. Vague
standards for regulatory action make it
very difficult to challenge a decision of a
regulator which allows too much freedom
of action to a regulated entity. A standardless delegation of legislative authority
to a regulator also compels the regulator
to spend more of his or her time justifying
decisions, since he or she cannot merely
point to a prohibition or a well-defined
standard in current law to justify a denial
of a requested exemption. Finally, vague
standards ultimately consign the adequacy
of regulation to the whim of the regulator.

The Bill Would Repeal Existing
Conflict of Interest Provisions
AB 2521 would repeal Financial
Code section 234, which sets forth a list
of transactions with banks that are forbidden to the Superintendent and to Department of Banking employees. The bill
would replace this clear list of prohibited
conduct in current law with a direction
to the Superintendent to promulgate a
code of ethics for Department personnel. 36
Although there is nothing wrong with a
code of ethics, a statute which directs
preparation of such a code should require
it to cover at least those activities now
prohibited by the Financial Code.

AB 2521 Would Allow Certain
Self-Dealing Transactions
Without Regulatory Approval
Presently, a bank may not engage in
transactions with its officers, members
of its board of directors, or with owning
entities without the permission of the
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Superintendent of Banking.37 AB 2521
would weaken this provision by permitting such self-dealing transactions without any notice to the regulator or any
regulatory approval so long as the amount
of the transaction is less than $500,000
or 1% of the bank's gross capital. 38

THE BANKERS' PROPOSAL
REDUCES CONSUMER RIGHTS
AB 2521 proposes changes in the
law which would hurt consumers. It
would exempt nationally-chartered
banks from a variety of consumer protection statutes; immunize banks for a
broad variety of violations of consumer,
civil rights, and other statutes; fail to
prevent harmful branch closings; allow
banks to prevent public access to information filed with the State Department
of Banking; require consumers to pay a
bank's attorneys' fees; and eliminate
other consumer rights.

The Bill May Exempt National
Banks from Many Consumer
Protection Provisions of
the Banking Code
The bill may exempt national banks
from certain consumer protection provisions now applicable to them, as a
result of the proposed redefinition of
the term "bank" in AB 2521. The bill
would define "bank" as those entities
licensed under the state Banking Law to
receive deposits. 39 This does not include
federally-chartered banks. Thus, where
the term "bank" is used in AB 2521,
unless otherwise stated in the chapter, it
refers only to state-chartered banks, unlike the present code. By reenacting existing consumer protection provisions using
the term "bank", while changing the
definition of that term, AB 2521 may
have the effect of exempting national
banks from those provisions. The affected provisions cover deposit account disclosure requirements, consumer rights
to notice and other protections in a
banker's set-off of a consumer deposit
against a debt owed to the bank, and
other provisions. 40
The bill would confer on nationallychartered banks all the rights, powers,
and immunities of state-chartered banks. 41
At the same time, AB 2521 would reduce
the powers of the Superintendent of
Banking over national banks. At present,
the Superintendent requires reports from
nationally-chartered banks, but AB 2521
would eliminate that power by limiting
its definition of "bank" to cover only
state-chartered and foreign banks. 42
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There is no reason why the Superintendent should not have power over national
banks conducting business in California,
at least to secure information and to
enforce state consumer protection statutes.

The Bill Creates Broad New
Immunities from Suit for
Banks and Trust Companies
AB 2521 would immunize banks and
trust companies from liability for a broad
variety of violations of law if they simply
correct the violation after the fact. 43 No
such broad immunity provision exists in
the current Banking Law. 44 An immunity
from liability would seriously undermine
the incentives to comply with various
consumer protection and penalty statutes. Consumer protection statutes which
authorize the imposition of civil damages
or penalties encourage banks to design
their forms and procedures to comply
with the law. The proposed immunity
provisions turn the principle of consumer
protection on its head. AB 2521 would
allow banks one "free bite"; that is, the
ability to escape liability for many types
of violations if the bank merely corrects
a violation after-and if-it is discovered
by consumers or the regulator.
Proposed section 447(a) of the bill
provides that illegal activities of a bank
or trust company are "deemed" to be in
compliance with the law so long as the
violation is not intentional, results from
bona fide error in spite of reasonable
procedures to avoid the error, and is
corrected within sixty days of discovery.
The section would prevent all civil liability arising under any state law for such
corrected errors. That immunity arguably
could apply even to violations of laws
other than the banking law, such as
California's civil rights statute 45 and its
laws against false advertising46 and unfair
and deceptive business practices. 47 No
other state statute offers such broad immunity to any industry.4B
This immunity from all civil liability
could be interpreted to immunize banks
even from suits to declare their conduct
illegal and enjoin it in the future. Further, the section does not clearly require
that correction be made for every person
or account affected by the violation in
addition to the person who complains.
Thus, a bank or trust company might
try to secure a defense to civil litigation
under this section by correcting its error
with respect to the consumer who complains, without investigating whether the
illegal practice has affected other customers and without correcting the violation affecting those persons.
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Proposed section 447(b) of AB 2521
would immunize banks from civil liability and civil penalties under the Banking
Law for any act done or omitted "in
good faith conformity" with any rule,
regulation, written interpretation, order,
or approval of the Superintendent of
Banking. Any bank or trust company
could attempt to secure this protection
simply by obtaining an opinion from its
lawyer that a contemplated act is "in
conformity" with current rules, regulations, interpretations, orders, or approvals of the Superintendent. As drafted,
this section could arguably protect a
bank when it engages in voluntary conduct not clearly forbidden by a specific
regulation, interpretation, order or approval of the Department of Banking,
even if it is not required by any law or
order to engage in that conduct.
Proposed section 447(c) would prevent the imposition of penalties, fines,
or punishments under any state law
against any bank for any act or omission which complies with any rule, regulation, interpretation, order, or approval
of the Superintendent even if the act
does not comply with other laws. Under
this broad immunity, a bank might claim
exemption from liability for discrimination in the hiring of employees for a new
branch on the ground that the Banking
Department had approved the opening
of the branch, even though the application for approval did not disclose that
the bank intended to engage in discrimination in hiring staff for that branch.
There is simply no reason why the Financial Code should grant special exemptions to banks or trust companies from
statutes which govern other types of
businesses, including California's civil
rights laws.

The Bill Weakens Current Law
Governing Bank Branch Relocations
AB 2521 proposes to weaken the law
governing changes in bank branch location. 49 It would allow all moves of a
branch of less than two miles to be
approved without any consideration of
the impact on the public. In many parts
of California, particularly those poorly
served by public transit, a two-mile move
could have a significant impact on the
availability of services to a community.
In Los Angeles, for example, this provision would allow the closing of a
branch in a minority neighborhood near
downtown Los Angeles and a reopening
in the financial district, or a closing
in predominantly low-income South Pasadena and a relocation to affluent Pasa-

dena, without any consideration of the
impact of the move on the community.
The bill also would allow a bank to
claim that a branch closure is simply a
"relocation" and thereby avoid the ninetyday notice requirement and the limited
scrutiny required for branch closings.
Although existing law defines a relocation as a change in location of less than
two miles, 50 AB 2521 has no geographic
limit on relocations. A bank which closes
an office in East Los Angeles and opens
one in Beverly Hills could call the change
a "relocation".
The bill also would eliminate all regulation of the closing of automated teller
machines. 51 Banks would not even have
to give notice to customers before closing
an ATM site.

The Standards for Scrutinizing
the Effect of Branch Closures
Are Inadequate
AB 2521 also fails to adequately protect bank customers from branch closures.
The bill requires that notice regarding
the closing of a branch must be given
only after approval of the closing. 52
Notice is not very meaningful when it is
given only after it is too late for customers to ask the Superintendent to deny
approval of the closing. The bill would
also make all branch closings automatically approved unless the Superintendent
denies the application within thirty days.s3
Current law contains no such automatic
approval provision, but instead permits
the Superintendent broad discretion to
deny an application to open or close a
branch. 54 A thirty-day period is far too
short to enable consumers to learn about
and object to the proposed change. Moreover, approval should never be automatic,
especially after there has been an objection.
Most importantly, the bill uses an
unduly narrow standard for evaluating
the impact of branch closures. It requires
the Superintendent to approve every
branch closure unless it would have a
"seriously adverse effect" on the public. 55
Current Department regulations use the
same language as the standard for the
exercise of the Superintendent's discretion.56 However, those regulations
merely set guidelines for the exercise of
the Superintendent's discretion and do
not compel him or her to approve every
branch closure which is harmful to the
community but the level of harm is less
than "seriously adverse." By contrast,
AB 2521 states that the Superintendent
must approve every proposed branch
closure if he or she finds that there
would not be a "seriously adverse effect"
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on the public convenience and advantage.57 This strict standard will severely
limit the Superintendent's ability to protect underserved communities from further withdrawals by banks.
Banks should not be permitted to
close branches indiscriminately. In 1983,
there was one bank branch or office for
every 5,200 Californians. By 1988, there
was only one branch per 6,300 persons.
Nearly three hundred bank branches or
offices closed in California in those five
years. 58 A bank which desires to close a
branch in an underserved area should be
required to prove that keeping the branch
open will impair the bank's fiscal health.
The bank should also be required to first
offer the branch and its accounts for sale
to any other financial institution which
will take over the location and accounts
and continue serving that community.

The Bill Would Allow Banks to
Prevent Public Access to Information
Filed with the Superintendent
AB 2521 would allow banks to prevent public access to a variety of information which banks and trust companies
file with the Superintendent of Banking. 59
The bill permits a regulated bank or trust
company to designate information which
is to be treated as confidential. It requires
the Superintendent to accept the bank
or trust company's assertion of confidentiality without any showing of good cause
or any independent determination of the
need for confidentiality. 60 Reports which
a bank has designated as confidential
could not be disclosed to the public. 61 They
also could not be disclosed in connection
with a civil or administrative proceeding
brought by persons other than the Superintendent or a federal banking agency.
Many consumer statutes carry civil penalties and are enforced by law enforcement
agencies or private attorneys general. 62
This section could deprive those law enforcement agencies acting to enforce consumer
protection statutes civilly from access to
information filed by a bank with the State
Banking Department. The bill's bias in favor
of secrecy is further revealed in provisions
that would prohibit even the bank or
trust company which filed the information
with the Banking Department from waiving the privilege against disclosure. 63

The Bill Would Require Some
Depositors to Pay A Bank's
Attorneys' Fees
Another example of the way AB 2521
is skewed in favor of banks and against
consumers is its proposed revision of
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current law governing awards of attorneys' fees to prevailing consumers in
suits regarding the adequacy of bank
disclosure of account terms and conditions.64 Existing law permits the award
of attorneys' fees to a prevailing consumer in such suits but not to a prevailing bank. 65 The California Bankers Association proposes to change that section to
one which would also permit a bank
which wins a lawsuit brought by a depositor over the adequacy of disclosure
of account terms to receive a court
award requiring the consumer to pay
the bank's attorneys' fees. 66 Needless
to say, such a provision would have a
chilling effect on a consumer's willingness to challenge a bank's disclosure
practices, even if the consumer has a
meritorious claim.

The Bill Would Eliminate
Other Consumer Rights
The bill would also eliminate or
reduce other consumer rights, including
the right to withdraw a certificate of
deposit or other insured time deposit
without penalty if the deposit is sold
to a new bank. 67 AB 2521 would eliminate that right for insured deposits. 68
A consumer who selects a particular
bank with which to do business based
upon that bank's location, personnel, or
role in the community could suddenly
find himself or herself in a deposit
relationship with a bank which the consumer never chose. The bill would also
eliminate existing language and type size
requirements concerning notices owed
to consumers when a bank seizes a customer's checking or savings account in
payment for other debts owed by the
customer to the bank under a so-called
"banker's set-off. ''6 9
The bill would allow a bank to enforce
contracts against minors, who are otherwise generally unable to contract.7° It
would expand the pool of persons who
are bound by a current section creating
a conclusive presumption that the consumer knew of an error in an account
statement after a certain period of
time.7 1 It would eliminate the right of
depositors to hold banks liable for
their common law negligence in accepting an unauthorized check.7 2 It
would eliminate the six-month waiting
period before a bank may open a safe
deposit box and remove its contents for
nonpayment of box rental fees.7 3 These
examples illustrate just some of the
changes in law proposed by AB 2521
which directly reduce existing consumer rights.
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THE CBA PROPOSAL FAILS
TO ADDRESS SERIOUS AND
LONGSTANDING CONSUMER
PROBLEMS WITH THE
BANKING INDUSTRY
The California Bankers Association's
proposal utterly fails to address several
serious and longstanding problems which
California consumers have experienced
with banks, including unaffordable checking accounts; refusal of banks to cash
government checks for non-depositors;
bank branch closings; lack of any ceilings on bank interest rates; and lack
of any requirement that banks prove a
record of good service to the community
before the Superintendent of Banking
gives them approvals to merge or expand.

Most Banks Refuse to Cash
Government Checks for
Non-Depositors
Most banks will not cash checks for
persons without an account, yet according to the General Accounting Office,
75% percent of families receiving AFDC
lack checking accounts. According to a
recent report, 82% of 81 financial institutions surveyed throughout California refused to cash government checks for
non-depositors at all, and 96% refused
to do so free of charge.7 4 Even those
few financial institutions which did cash
the checks often allowed branch managers the discretion to refuse to provide
the service.75 Californians without checking accounts are often forced to use
high-cost non-bank check-cashing services. These services charge from 1-6%
to cash government assistance checks,
with an average charge of 2.15%. 76 On
a $500 check, 2% is a $10 fee, and 6% is
a $30 fee. Any new version of the banking law should require that banks which
choose to accept government deposits
must cash government checks for nondepositors without charge.

Consumers Need Low-Cost
Checking Accounts
Consumers of low or modest income
levels often cannot afford the monthly
service charges and high minimum balance requirements of most checking
accounts. One study showed that 53%
of persons who used money orders could
not afford a checking account, found
the service charges too high, or could
not accept minimum balance requirements.77 Charges paid by bank customers rose 120% from 1978 to 1982 (from
$4.9 billion to $10.8 billion). 78 High
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checking account fees also have a disproportionate impact on minorities. One
study showed that only 47% of minority
families have checking accounts, as compared to 85% of white families.79 The ·
federal banking regulators have urged
financial institutions to offer basic banking services at no or low cost. 80
The fundamental characteristics of a
basic checking account are ease of account opening and low cost to maintain.
Such an account should, at minimum,
have the following characteristics: no
monthly fee or a fee of not more than
$1 per month; no per-<:heck or per-deposit
charge for the first ten checks and the
first three deposits per month; no minimum balance to open, and no minimum
balance to maintain; and identification
requirements which may be met by the
low-income population. Any rewrite of
the banking code should address this
important consumer problem by requiring that state-chartered banks make
available affordable basic accounts of
this type.

Better Safeguards Are Needed
to Protect Consumers From the
Impact of Branch Closures
The problem of bank branch closures
was addressed earlier in this article. In
addition to the timing of notice and
standard of approval issues already discussed there, any rewrite of the Financial
Code should affirmatively and aggressively address the problem of underserved
communities, possibly by requiring a
bank which desires to close a branch to
first offer the branch and its accounts
for sale to any other financial institution
which is willing to take over the location
and accounts and continue serving that
community. In addition, the Superintendent could be directed by law to identify
those communities which are underserved
and to deny permission for further branch
closures in those areas unless the closure
is necessary to preserve the financial
soundness of the bank.

Consumers Deserve the Protection
of An Interest Rate Ceiling
Most interest rates charged by banks
in California are totally unregulated.
AB 2521 proposes a broadening of the
exemptions for bank subsidiaries from
the anti-usury provisions of the California Constitution. State-chartered banks
have charged Californians as much as
32-226% as an annual percentage interest
rate. New York, by contrast, has a general ceiling on interest rates of 25%. 81
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Any comprehensive banking bill should
include a ceiling on consumer interest
rates by banks and all other lenders of
not more than 25% annual percentage
interest rate.

Banks Should Prove That
They Adequately Serve the
Community Before Receiving
Regulatory Approvals
Under the federal Community Reinvestment Act, federal agencies regu1a ting depository institutions must
consider "the institution's record of
meeting the credit needs of its entire
community, including low- and moderateincome neighborhoods ... "82 when they
evaluate applications for transactions
such as acquisitions, mergers, or new
branches. Banks are subject to regulatory
scrutiny concerning whether they have
met these obligations each time they
seek a variety of approvals from the
federal banking regulators. 83 The State
Superintendent of Banking should have
the same power and obligation to examine a state-chartered bank's record of
meeting community needs before the Department grants regulatory permission
for sales, mergers, acquisitions, changes
in branch location, waiver of regulations,
or other regulatory approvals. A state
banking charter is no less a privilege
than a federal charter. Nonetheless, there
is no provision in the state banking law
which requires the Superintendent of
Banking to consider the records of statechartered banks before granting regulatory approvals. Thus, each section of
the bill which deals with regulatory approvals should require the Superintendent to find, as a precondition for approval, that the applying bank has an excellent
record of serving the deposit and lending
needs of low- and moderate-income Californians, or has proposed a plan to do so.

CBA Has Not Shown a Need
for a Comprehensive Rewrite of
the California Banking Law
At the first informational hearing on
AB 2521 held by the Assembly Finance

and Insurance Committee and the Senate
Banking Committee, bill authors and
committee chairs Assemblymember Patrick Johnston and Senator Rose Ann
Vuich called upon the California Bankers Association (CBA), as the sponsor
of AB 2521, to explain why it believes
that a substantial revision of the banking law is necessary. CBA responded by
discussing the changes in the banking
industry, such as new technology, which

have occurred since the current code
was written. However, CBA did not offer
any reason why those technological
changes require a complete revision of
the Banking Law, nor did it point to
any changes in the banking industry
that compel the particular amendments
proposed by CBA in AB 2521. CBA
representatives talked about the benefits
of a well-organized code, but the provisions of AB 2521 go far beyond simple
renumbering or reorganization. CBA
still has made no showing of need for
such a broad rewrite of California's fundamental banking law.

CONCLUSION
The California Bankers Association
has proposed sweeping changes in the
division of the Financial Code governing
banks, yet it has not shown a need for
these changes. The serious problems and
deficiencies in AB 2521 are a timely
illustration of the principle that regulated industries should not write regulatory laws.
In her opening statement at the joint
informational hearing, Senator Vuich
called upon the California Bankers Association to address how this bill would
benefit California consumers. Consumers
Union believes that the unfortunate
answer to this question is that the bill as
presently drafted does not benefit and in
fact harms consumers.
The legislature should decline to enact
AB 2521 and rewrite the California Financial Code governing banks unless its
provisions reducing consumer rights and
weakening the effectiveness of the regulatory structure are removed, and affirmative provisions are added to address
longstanding consumer problems with
banks, including the issues of access to
check cashing services by banks, access
to affordable checking accounts, ceilings
on interest rates, better scrutiny of
branch closures, and stimulation of investment in low-income housing and community economic development.
AB 2521 authors Johnston and Vuich
have stated that they plan to hold a
series of public hearings on the bill to
clearly identify those aspects of the bill
which propose substantive changes and
to fully explore the issues raised by these
proposed changes. Those changes should
be separated from the recodification aspects of the bill and rejected. If any bill
which proposes substantive changes to
the law governing banks is to move
forward, that bill should also make
changes which address important consumer problems.
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